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Enrich Your Future 24: Why Smart People Do Dumb Things

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Quick take

In this episode of Enrich Your Future, Andrew and Larry Swedroe discuss Larry’s new book, Enrich Your Future: The Keys to Successful Investing. In this series, they discuss Chapter 24: Why Do Smart People Do Dumb Things?

LEARNING: Past performance does not guarantee future results. Change the criteria you use to select managers.

 

“There are only two things that are infinite, the universe and man’s capacity for stupidity.”

Larry Swedroe

 

In this episode of Enrich Your Future, Andrew and Larry Swedroe discuss Larry’s new book, Enrich Your Future: The Keys to Successful Investing. The book is a collection of stories that Larry has developed over 30 years as the head of financial and economic research at Buckingham Wealth Partners to help investors. You can learn more about Larry’s Worst Investment Ever story on Ep645: Beware of Idiosyncratic Risks.

Larry deeply understands the world of academic research and investing, especially risk. Today, Andrew and Larry discuss Chapter 24: Why Do Smart People Do Dumb Things?

Chapter 24: Why Do Smart People Do Dumb Things?

In this chapter, Larry discusses why investors still make mistakes despite multiple SEC warnings.

The past performance delusion

Larry explains that it’s normal for most investors to make mistakes when investing, often due to behavioral errors like overconfidence. Being overconfident can cause investors to take too much risk, trade too much, and confuse the familiar with the safe. Those are explainable errors.

However, there’s one mistake that Larry finds hard to explain. Most investors ignore the SEC’s required warning that accompanies all mutual fund advertising: “Past performance does not guarantee future results.” Despite an overwhelming body of evidence, including the annual S&P’s Active Versus Passive Scorecards, that demonstrates that active managers’ past mutual fund returns are not prologue and the SEC’s warning, investors still flock to funds that have performed well in the past.

Today’s underperforming manager may be tomorrow’s outperformer

According to Larry, various researchers have found that the common selection methodology is detrimental to performance. The greater benchmark-adjusted return to investing in ‘loser funds’ over ‘winner funds’ is statistically and economically large and robust to reasonable variations in the evaluation and holding periods and standard risk adjustments.

Additionally, the standard practice of firing managers who have recently underperformed actually eliminates those managers who are more likely to outperform in the future.

Why Are Warnings Worthless?

Larry quotes the study “Worthless Warnings? Testing the Effectiveness of Disclaimers in Mutual Fund Advertisements,” which provided some interesting results. The authors found that people viewing the advertisement with the current SEC disclaimer were just as likely to invest in a fund and had the exact expectations regarding a fund’s future returns as people viewing the advertisement with no disclaimer whatsoever.

The authors concluded that the SEC-mandating disclaimer is completely ineffective. The disclaimer neither reduces investors’ propensity to invest in advertised funds nor diminishes their expectations regarding future returns.

The current SEC disclaimer is too weak

The authors noted that the current disclaimer fails because it is too weak. It only conveys that high past returns don’t guarantee high future returns and that investors in the fund could lose money, things that almost all investors already know.

It fails to convey what investors need to understand: high past returns are a poor predictor of high future returns. In the authors’ opinion, a stronger disclaimer—one that informs investors that high fund returns generally don’t persist (they are often a matter of chance)—would be much more effective.

The insane investor

In conclusion, Larry observes that many investors do the same thing over and over again and expect a different outcome. Most seem never to stop and ask: If the managers I hired based on their past outperformance have underperformed after being hired, why do I think the new managers I hire to replace them will outperform if I use the same criteria that have repeatedly failed? And, if I am not doing anything different, why should I expect a different outcome?

Change the criteria you use to select managers

Larry advises investors to change the criteria they use to select managers. Instead of relying mainly, if not solely, on past performance, they should use criteria such as fund expenses and the fund’s degree of exposure to well-documented factors (such as size, value, momentum, profitability, and quality) that have been shown to have provided premiums.

These premiums should have evidence that they have been persistent, pervasive, robust to various definitions, implementable (they survive transaction costs) and that they have intuitive explanations for why you should expect the premium to persist.

By using criteria that lead to superior results, investors can avoid actively managed funds and significantly increase their chances of achieving better investment outcomes.

Further reading

  1. Itzhak Ben-David, Jiacui Li, Andrea Rossi, and Yang Son, “Advice-Driven Demand and Systematic Price Fluctuations,” February 2021.
  2. Bradford Cornell, Jason Hsu and David Nanigian, “Does Past Performance Matter in Investment Manager Selection?” Journal of Portfolio Management, Summer 2017.
  3. Rob Bauer, Rik Frehen, Hurber Lum and Roger Otten, “The Performance of U.S. Pension Plans,” 2008.
  4. Amit Goyal and Sunil Wahal, “The Selection and Termination of Investment Management Firms by Plan Sponsors,” Journal of Portfolio Management (August 2008).
  5. Molly Mercer, Alan R. Palmer and Ahmed E. Taha, “Worthless Warnings? Testing the Effectiveness of Disclaimers in Mutual Fund Advertisements,” Journal of Empirical Legal Studies (September 2010).

Did you miss out on the previous chapters? Check them out:

Part I: How Markets Work: How Security Prices are Determined and Why It’s So Difficult to Outperform

Part II: Strategic Portfolio Decisions

Part III: Behavioral Finance: We Have Met the Enemy and He Is Us

About Larry Swedroe

Larry Swedroe was head of financial and economic research at Buckingham Wealth Partners. Since joining the firm in 1996, Larry has spent his time, talent, and energy educating investors on the benefits of evidence-based investing with an enthusiasm few can match.

Larry was among the first authors to publish a book that explained the science of investing in layman’s terms, “The Only Guide to a Winning Investment Strategy You’ll Ever Need.” He has authored or co-authored 18 books.

Larry’s dedication to helping others has made him a sought-after national speaker. He has made appearances on national television on various outlets.

Larry is a prolific writer, regularly contributing to multiple outlets, including AlphaArchitect, Advisor Perspectives, and Wealth Management.